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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

Ag Memo 145

PRELIMINARY

CONFIDENTIAL

R & A 1069

August 27, 1943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
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GERMAN REACTIONS TO WARTIME CONDITIONS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES

I. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are of a threefold nature: they affirm the reliability of the sources used; they describe the reactions of the average German to wartime conditions and differentiate them according to place and time; and they suggest a plan for future operations.

The only way of assessing quantitatively the effect of wartime conditions upon the average German is through letters from Germany. Canadian Postal Censorship has undertaken to tabulate the mail addressed to German prisoners of war in Canada according to categories: War, Food, Commodities, Air Raids, Health, Labor, Miscellaneous. Their statistics are not completely reliable. There are, however, a number of factors proving that, although the tabulations may deviate from the truth to a certain extent, they are not altogether misleading. The varying reactions to food, commodities, and air raids reflect fairly accurately the course of events. Furthermore, where there are two reports for the same period, the figures show only insignificant differences, (the most striking instance being Periodical Diary No. 23 and No. 24). In conclusion it may be said that while small deviations of

percentages may be due to incorrect sampling, larger differences are significant and may be taken to reflect the reaction of the particular sector of the German population.

Once the relative reliability of the Canadian statistics is granted, a number of points may be established. "Informative" mail from Germany to Canada dropped from 30 and 40 percent of the total batch in the summer of 1942 to about 1[illegible] percent in the winter of 1942-43. The difference cannot be explained except by growing apathy plus an increased strictness of censorship concealing concern over privations. Censorship is growing more and more powerless with regard to air raids; immediately after an air raid it is not very effective in preventing the inhabitants of a city from writing about the effects. Examination of the way in which the "informative" mail is distributed among the various categories shows that, on the average, the war as a whole is most often commented upon, food follows a close second, commodities and air raids follow with about the same frequency, and least mention is given to health and labor problems.

A further aspect of the study relates to regional differences. In general, border regions or cities show an extraordinarily high interest in the war. Most "safe" areas bother very little about air raids. Food is a major concern in rural areas about harvest-time; at other times these same areas care as little about it as industrial areas do throughout the year. Shortages in commodities other than food are

felt most keenly in Berlin and in the Baltic provinces (excluding the port cities), and least of all in Bavaria and in the North Sea and Baltic ports (from Emden to Reval). Labor shortages are mentioned more frequently in the unbombed areas than in the bombed ones, and health consciousness is distributed evenly over the Reich.

While the distribution of interest in the individual factors (war, food, etc.) over the Reich thus yields a fairly reasonable picture, the same cannot be said of the schemes of distribution as a whole, i.e., the composition of the entire informative mail. Baden and Bremen on the one hand, the Saar Basin and the Mark Brandenburg on the other, show almost identical schemes, yet they are very far apart in their economic setup. Bavaria and Austria, however, which are so closely related in all respects, agree in nothing but their great interest in the war. It may well be that here lies one of the greatest values of the Canadian mail: it shows unexpected and inexplicable similarities and dissimilarities.

Examination of the chronological development of reactions towards the various items reveals that interest in the war rises steadily from the moment when the tide begins to turn against Germany. Air-raid consciousness follows very closely the frequency and intensity of actual air raids, and it may be expected that in future the figures will give an even more faithful picture of actual conditions. Food consciousness rises considerably during the harvest months and

falls rapidly during autumn and winter. Since October 1942, reactions to the shortages in commodities have been increasing steadily in volume, in other words, from the moment when the Kriegsauflageprogramm directed everyone's attention to a critical situation. The health curve fluctuates only slightly and does not permit any safe inferences. With regard to labor, the seriousness of the manpower problem was felt most distinctly during harvest-time and immediately after the mobilization decrees.

In view of the above it seems important that the findings of the Canadian censors be studied and used continually as an up-to-date barometer of German attitudes. They offer a moderately reliable, quantitative picture of priorities in German thoughts and worries. They reveal trends in censorship which in turn lead to inferences with regard to the seriousness of the various hardships. Furthermore, in case of an attack on a given locality it might be possible to draw a reasonably clear picture of conditions in this locality prior to the attack and to estimate its effect upon the civilian population. Even before the actual raid an assessment might be made of its probable effects, perhaps with the help of localities which have a similar scheme of distribution and which have undergone attacks of comparable intensity. Thus the Canadian mail and the statistics of the Canadian censors not only give a moderately clear picture of the attitudes of the German civilian population but

they may facilitate an assessment of future attacks even before the echo from Germany reaches Canada.

II. INTRODUCTION

The physical condition of the German civilian population has been studied from many points of view, and the supply and demand for the various commodities and services necessary for human life have been defined and appraised with reasonable accuracy. It remains to find out how wartime conditions have affected the mind and the soul of the German civilian. It seems probable that privations of one type are more keenly felt and resented than those of another; that the attitudes of the individual towards them and the war changes according to time and place; and that with a clearer idea of German reactions to these factors, United Nations military, economic, and psychological warfare can be adapted to these findings.

It is obvious that any attempt to assess the German mind quantitatively is beset by the most terrific difficulties. First of all, matters of the mind do not lend themselves easily to statistical methods. Secondly, even under normal conditions many individuals are unable or unwilling to express their true feelings and thoughts, and few observers are competent to interpret these expressions. Thirdly -- and here the obstacles become all but unsurmountable -- under wartime conditions the possibilities of observing the enemy mind at work are reduced to a minimum. Oral communications become impossible.

Mail addressed to the outside world labors under the direct effects of censorship; in addition, for reasons of patriotism and commonsense the average citizen refrains more or less voluntarily from any statement that might give help or comfort to the enemies of his country, especially if he knows that such statements may endanger his personal safety (Gestapo). Finally, the writer of a letter may ignore to a greater or lesser degree his own situation and write for the benefit of the addressee, i.e., if the latter is a national of a neutral or enemy country, he may want to influence his "morale"; if he is a prisoner of war in a foreign country, he may want to comfort him.

In spite of all these difficulties, the task of analyzing the enemy mind on a statistical basis is of such paramount importance that the attempt must be made. Available for study are a considerable number of Periodical Diaries and Regional Reports issued by Canadian Postal Censorship. In the Periodical Diaries the censors report on letters from the entire Reich, mailed during a period of six to eight weeks and addressed to German prisoners of war in Canada; in the Regional Reports they do the same for mail from a given German region or city. In all of their recent issues the censors indicate the total number of letters read. They then proceed to deduct from this figure the letters containing mere family news without general interest. The balance is excerpted on submission slips and the number of excerpts made constitutes the "informative" mail; it may be larger than the number of informative letters or informative correspondents because several excerpts may be made from one informative letter. From this informative

mail they give in percentages the number of mentions made in the letters in regard to the following categories: Morale, Food, Commodities, Air Raids, Health, Labor, Miscellaneous.

A word of explanation is needed for each of these categories. The term **morale** lends itself very easily to misunderstanding. The overwhelming majority of the statements classified by the Canadian censors under **morale** deal with the individual's attitude towards the war (confidence in victory, pride at German successes, hopes for an early peace, etc.). In order to prevent an erroneous interpretation, the category **Morale** of the Canadians will henceforth appear as **Interest in The War** in this memorandum. No distinction will be made between a favorable, unfavorable, or neutral reaction to the war (good, bad, neutral "morale"); this topic may be reserved for further study. A large number of references to **food** in the letters are favorable. High food consciousness therefore does not necessarily mean a large number of complaints about food but rather much praise for the distribution of food in Germany and a high degree of interest in food. The situation is different with regard to **commodities** other than food. Here practically all statements concern shortages in commodities, although they are not necessarily complaints. Mentions of **air raids** are ambivalent: the raids may strengthen feelings of patriotism, they may leave the individual relatively unaffected, and they may injure or destroy his stamina. As a rule, the Canadian censors count and tabulate only negative

statements about health, i.e., mentions of diseases. High health consciousness therefore means many mentions of diseases. References to labor either concern shortages of manpower, or hard work, or long hours; they are rarely complaints, but they are almost always indications of a tight situation. In summing up, it may be said that references to the war and air raids are ambivalent; to food, possibly positive; to commodities, health, and labor, negative.

By comparing the percentages given for each of these categories it becomes possible to form an idea at least for that part of the German population that corresponds with prisoners in Canada and ventures beyond family news. The percentage of informative mail out of total mail dropped from 30 percent and more in the summer of 1942 to slightly more than 15 percent in the winter of 1942-43. The other 70 or 85 percent does not touch upon subjects of general interest, either from apathy or because of the direct or indirect effects of censorship. At the moment only the informative mail will be analyzed, and all figures given in this report will be percentages upon the informative mail. At the end of the report it will be attempted to extend the results to the entire German population.

One final difficulty should be mentioned in passing. After recognizing the limitations of the results mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it might be argued that an individual who (for instance) thinks first of all of air raids might be induced by censorship to write about food instead. More

abstractly it might be maintained that censorship is able to shift communications from one category to another. It is perfectly possible that the man who wants to write about an air raid cannot do so because of censorship. It may be, too, that this man either gives up writing at all or satisfies himself with family news or writes untruthfully about air raids. But psychologically it is highly unlikely that he shifts from one category to another because of censorship.

III. THREE PATTERNS OF THE GERMAN MIND

In order to build on as solid a foundation as possible, Table 1 presents three patterns (A, B, C) of the German mind. The patterns represent batches of 123, 360, and 766 informative letters respectively. The war by itself occupies between 12 and 32 percent of the writers. It will be noticed, furthermore, that in all three of the patterns, the war and food together make up 40 percent of the batch. Indeed, at all periods covered by the Periodical Diaries, war and food make up between 35 and 50 percent of the informative mail. Food and other commodities together oscillate between 20 and 35 percent. Health fluctuates between 8 and 10 percent, and labor between 8 and 12 percent. Air raids vary from 7 to 21 percent, with most of the items lying between 10 and 15 percent.

It is clear that only significant deviations from the norm may be called reliable. It would, for instance, be wrong to attach much importance to the difference of air-raid consciousness in Patterns A and B, but, with regard to air

raids, it is safe to put faith in the difference between A and B on the one side and C on the other (8.9 percent). Small deviations are meaningless; larger ones are significant.

The three patterns are taken from a total of sixteen Periodical Diaries dating from July 1942 - March 1943. Table 2 shows the weighted averages for this entire period and thus offers the quickest bird's-eye view with regard to the scheme of distribution.

IV. REGIONAL VARIATIONS

A regional breakdown is given in Table 3. Comparison with Table 1 should be undertaken only with the greatest caution. It is obvious that the average percentages under War in Table 3 lie far above those in Table 1. If one compares the weighted averages of the two tables, which ought to be identical, one finds that they differ, but not to a degree which would distort the relative importance of the various factors: they are 22.6 and 31.7, respectively. The difference of 9 percent shows that although our figures are not altogether reliable, they are not very far from the truth.

As far as the war is concerned, Hamburg (in the summer of 1942), the Rhineland, Silesia, Bavaria, and Austria (all in the winter of 1942-43) are far above average in their interest, while Bremen, Baden, and Berlin (April-July 1942) lie far below it. The regions with exceptionally high war consciousness all lie on the fringes of the Old Reich, they are all urban, and they have a more cosmopolitan attitude. Berlin,

the administrative center, worries surprisingly little about the war.

Air-raid consciousness is amazingly low in most localities, except at Bremen in July and August 1942, (there was a heavy raid in July), and especially at Berlin in April 1943 (after the March raids). The low percentage in the Rhineland (October-December 1942) and possibly in the North Sea and Baltic ports (November 1942-January 1943) cannot be explained except by an exceptionally strict censorship: the Rhinelanders and Pomeranians who would have liked to write about air raids have been forced by censorship into the group of uninformative correspondents. It is perhaps natural that the "safe" areas show a low figure, but the total unconcern in certain safe areas and the shockingly low figures in others prove that, with regard to air raids, the inhabitants of the "safe" regions show very little sympathy for their brothers in the bombed areas. Goebbels' statements to the contrary are a goal of propaganda rather than statements of fact. It is true, however, that most of our data go back to a period when German propaganda was anxious to restrict knowledge of air raids to the bombed city itself; the wide publicity given to air raids at this writing may succeed in making the much-vaunted solidarity of the Reich a reality.

As to the regional distribution of food consciousness, predominantly rural areas (Baltic provinces, Baden, Mark Brandenburg, Westfalia with Hessen and Nassau) in summer and early fall are highest. Saxony with Thuringia and Anhalt appear in this category of high food consciousness because

"most of the letters come from rural districts" (Regional Report No. 7). Bremen with its high food consciousness presents a puzzle which may be explained by the inclusion, in the report, of Eastern Frisia. Greater Berlin in August and September, as well as the Saar Basin in August and September, likewise have an exceptionally high food consciousness. From October 1942 on, food consciousness seems low in country and city alike, and even during harvest-time it does not rise much in the cities (with the exception of Bremen) and industrial regions. In the final result it may be said that time (summer and early fall) and place (rural area) factors have to be combined to produce high food consciousness; if only one of them is lacking, food consciousness is likely to be low.

It will be shown in Section V that commodities other than food are mentioned more and more frequently in the mail. For this reason, low figures at an early date and high figures at a later date are the rule: only exceptionally high figures at a late date, low figures at a late date, or high figures at an early date are at all remarkable. The rule is best represented by Hamburg, where the percentage almost doubles between summer and winter 1942. Although the figure is not very high, it is remarkable that there was so much concern about commodities in the Baltic provinces as early as July and August 1942. Berlin reached the top percentage as early as August and September 1942. The North Sea and Baltic ports and Bavaria bother very little about commodities at a relatively late date (November 1942-

January 1943 and December 1942 respectively). In April 1943 Berlin fell from 21.6 percent in August-September 1942 to 10.5 percent -- a fact which must be attributable to severe censorship with regard to shortages. On the whole it may be said that shortages are most keenly felt in Berlin and in the Baltic provinces, and least of all in Bavaria and in the North Sea and Baltic ports. The example of Berlin leads to the expectation that there will be less and less about shortages in censored mail from Germany.

Consciousness of the labor problem is fairly evenly distributed over Germany, and existing differentials are not easy to explain. Both rural and industrial areas show high and low labor consciousness, both at an early and at a late date. Areas with high labor consciousness (Baden with Württemberg, Austria, Mecklenburg and Pomerania, Saar Basin) are, with one exception (Berlin), unbombed or not heavily bombed areas, and their labor consciousness is probably due to the fact that evacuation of factories into these areas has created a considerable demand for manpower. The average labor consciousness appears both in bombed and unbombed areas. The low labor consciousness in Westfalia (with Hessen and Nassau) may be due to the fact that most of the informative mail comes from the rural districts.

Health consciousness is even more evenly distributed than labor consciousness. Only Bavaria (December 1942-February 1943) and Berlin (April-July 1942) lie far above the average, while Austria (November-December 1942), the Rhineland (October-

December 1942), and Greater Berlin (August-September 1942) are far below it. Bavaria may head the list because of its many winter resorts. The fact is that "there are more health complaints in Bavaria than in the mail from some other districts" (Regional Report No. 23). There is good reason, on the other hand, for the high health consciousness in Berlin from April-July 1942: the sudden drop for the capital in the late fall cannot be due to anything but censorship, and the new height in April 1943 shows that health complaints are now overflowing even the strong barriers erected by censorship. The low figure for the Rhineland from October to December 1942 must be due to the same reasons as those that apply to Berlin.

After analyzing the reactions of the various localities to individual factors, it might be profitable to compare the entire schemes of interests of two or more regions. A few characteristic examples follow. Baden in July and August 1942 and Bremen from August to October 1942 show an almost identical scheme, except that Bremen, of course, has much more concern for air raids and Baden for food. Both have comparatively little interest in the war, and a good deal in food. Another interesting pair of the same kind are the Saar Basin in September-October 1942 and the Mark Brandenburg in October-November 1942: little interest in the war; equal interest in food, labor, health; but the Saar worries somewhat over air raids (the Mark Brandenburg does not do so at all) and the Mark Brandenburg is more concerned than the Saar about commodities other than food.

Hamburg in November-December 1942 is hardly more interested in the general situation than either of the two, little more than the Saar in air raids, but worries more than either about commodities, much less about labor problems, and much more about health. The effect of a considerable air raid upon this situation in a large city can best be studied by comparing Hamburg in November-December 1942 with Berlin in April 1943, i.e., after the March raids on the latter city. The interest in the war remains static, air-raid consciousness soars high, food and commodities become much less attractive topics of correspondence, labor consciousness rises considerably, and health consciousness remains static. Bavaria (December 1942-February 1943) and Austria (November-December 1942) -- two regions so closely related in many respects -- show the same high amount of interest in the war; food, commodities, and labor play an incommensurably larger role in Austria than in Bavaria, while Austria is much less concerned about health. Hamburg in the summer of 1942 and Silesia in mid-winter 1942-43 show the same high interest in the war, are both hardly concerned about air raids, but react somewhat differently with regard to most other factors.

The result of all such comparisons seems to be that the distribution of interests does not follow any clearly recognizable scheme. Agricultural and industrial areas, "safe" and bombed cities, city and country -- all may show the same or a different scheme of distribution. In other words, while

reactions to merely individual factors can be explained by economic conditions in the particular locality, the scheme as a whole depends less on the economic situation of the region than on the spirit of the human beings that live in it. It is this spirit of the local population which can be ascertained with the help of the Canadian mail.

Since air raid consciousness depends so heavily on local conditions, one further general remark about air raids may be in order. Hitherto, patriotic discipline and censorship have prevented the air raids from making their influence felt in the correspondence to the degree that would be expected. But from the existing evidence, it may be said that a significant concern for air raids excludes a high percentage of interest in the war, in other words, air raids destroy the individual's concern for the national welfare and narrow his horizon down to his own community.

V. TREND ANALYSIS

For this purpose it is useful to compare not only the three patterns (Table 1) but also a graph showing the development of mail from Germany from July 1942 to May 1943. Such a graph has been drawn by the Canadian censors (Periodical Diary No. 25) but our Table 4 gives it in a more complete form. In it we have made use only of data valid for a period of two months at the most. Wherever one of the Canadian Periodical Diaries exceeded that period, the percentages have not been used for the drawing of the graph.

Interest in the war oscillates in the months of July and August 1942, but the trend is clearly downward (from 32 to 12 percent). From September on, it rises steadily and reaches a new high (28 percent) by mid-January 1943 (Stalingrad). By March 1943 it has sunk again to 21 percent, and by mid-May it soars to almost 50 percent of the informative mail. It would seem then that German interest in the war and in the situation in general has been increasing steadily from the moment when the tide seemed to turn against Germany.

Air raid consciousness fluctuates, but remains fairly stable during the months of July to October 1942. In November and December it sinks very low (7 and 9 percent), climbs again in January 1943, and reaches a new high in March 1943. In May 1943 it has sunk again. The low points in air raid consciousness are due to the fact that in November and December 1942 there were only few and slight raids. These lows prove two things: the counting of intercept letters is a relatively sensitive barometer with regard to seasonal differences in air raids; and under the strain of wartime conditions and with the rapid pace of the war, human memory is relatively short. There are reasons to expect in the future even more significant fluctuations of air raid consciousness. Under the earlier policy of keeping knowledge of individual raids restricted to the area actually bombed, it was relatively easy to prevent leakages by a rigorous censorship at the source. At the present time, however, when German propaganda plays up all the

raids on a nationwide scale, messages about each raid will come from all over the country.

The curve for food consciousness rises from July to September 1942 in a parabola from 8 to 30 percent, falls rapidly to 15 percent from October to December 1942, and then declines slowly to 8 percent in March 1943 -- the point from which it had started. Two interpretations of this rise and decline are possible: they were due (1) either to the increase in rations that occurred in October 1942, or (2) to the fact that the harvesting was finished by that date. The latter interpretation seems more likely.

Commodities other than food follow a very simple pattern. Between July and October 1942, the pendulum swings between 8 and 12 percent. From October 1942 on, concern over commodities rises steadily to more than 15 percent in March 1943. Once again the material presented by the Canadian censors proves to be a reliable index for the real situation: precisely in October 1942 the Reich started the Kriegsauflagenprogramm, which was indicative of an acute shortage in the supply of civilian commodities.

The figures for health do not permit any valid inferences; the curve runs rather irregularly between 6 and 11 percent, and the deviations do not seem significant enough to allow for conclusions. It should be remembered, however, that since early 1943 German censorship has been particularly strict with regard to serious diseases and has made it a practice to

excise their names.

The fluctuations of the labor graph are somewhat more significant (6 to 14 percent). It sinks low in the fall (September - November 1942) and begins picking up again in the winter (November - December 1942). Apparently, the labor shortage was felt acutely in the summer (harvest-time), then shrank in importance and reappeared in the limelight at the time when the mobilization decrees were issued. However, caution is warranted with regard to data showing deviations as unimportant as those of the labor graph.

At the end of this trend analysis, it seems advisable to examine those regions or cities for which Regional Reports were issued at least twice. They are (see Table 4): Berlin (1) April-July 1942, (2) August-September 1942, (3) April 1943; Hamburg (1) July and August 1942, (2) November and December 1942; Baden (1) August-October 1942, (2) March-April 1943 (including Württemberg). In Berlin, interest in the war rose considerably in the summer but sank somewhat by April 1943. Air raids are mentioned only in April 1943, and with the highest of all regional figures because of the March raids. Concern for food tripled in the summer of 1942, but had sunk to little more than nothing by April 1943. Between the summer of 1942 and April 1943, commodities fell by 50 percent and labor gained 100 percent. Health consciousness was fairly high in the summer of 1942 and the spring of 1943, but in the fall of 1942 it had sunk to a very low figure. In short, in Berlin the

the interest in the war remains roughly static, but the air raids rise in importance and squeeze food and commodities out of people's minds.

At Hamburg the development is different. Food and labor remain relatively stable between summer and winter 1942. Interest in the war falls by almost 50 percent, air raids gain considerably, commodities and health rise by 100 percent. In other words, worries about the situation of the individual make many people forget about the general situation.

In Baden concern for the war, air raids, commodities, and labor problems rises significantly between early fall of 1942 and the spring of 1943. Interest in food drops to a sixth of its former percentage. This is the above-mentioned high food consciousness at harvest-time which, after the season is over, is distributed more or less proportionately over the other items. The sharp drop in health consciousness is difficult to explain.

VI. APPLICABILITY OF RESULTS TO ENTIRE GERMAN POPULATION

Are the results which were obtained above applicable to the entire German population? Directly they refer only to that sector that corresponds with German prisoners in Canada and writes "informative mail." It may be claimed with some assurance that figures valid for all Germans corresponding with prisoners in Canada may be applied to the entire German population; there is no reason to assume that these correspondents are not a fair sample of the country as a whole. It

is, however, a much more serious step to make an inference from the informative writers to the total number of writers. There can be no doubt that among the writers of uninformative letters there are some, perhaps many, whose thoughts center around matters of considerable interest but who (by patriotic self-discipline or by censorship) are compelled to write about things uninformative ("potential informants"). In all probability such "potential informants" among the uninformative correspondents are not distributed in the same way as the openly informative writers. It may be supposed that among the "potential informants" there would be more references to the war and less to food than among the open informants. The food condition in Germany is far from desperate and censorship can afford to allow considerable freedom with regard to food; informants about food, therefore, will in most cases be able to record their true feelings, and their letters will arrive safely in Canada. With regard to the war, on the other hand, a writer has only two alternatives: either to elaborate on the official German propaganda, or to keep away from the subject altogether. In other words, the more serious the German condition with regard to a given category, the more correspondents will shift from the group of "open informants" to that of "potential informants."

Naturally there exists no way of polling the "potential informants" and only guesses are possible. There will always be a considerable number of correspondents who not only write uninformative letters but also think uninformative thoughts. It is possible that this group is increasing (apathy), but in

any case its actual size is unknown to us. This in turn makes it impossible to estimate the number of the "potential informants." Only a few hints can be made here, especially with regard to the average figures given in Table 2. The existence of a genuinely uninformative group will deflate all percentages if they are based on the total (uninformative plus informative) population. In view of what was said above, the deflation will be greatest with regard to those items where Germany's position is most critical, and slightest where the strain is particularly small. It is suggested that in ascending order of seriousness the categories of the Canadian censors may be arranged as follows: Miscellaneous, Food, Labor, Commodities, Health, Air Raids, War. This writer believes that if these "deflations" could be expressed in figures, they would lead to corrections, but not to the complete overthrow of priorities in the scheme of distribution. This cannot be proved, but there is one argument which would point in this direction. Table 2 shows that an average of 12.9 percent of the informative letters from July 1942 to March 1943 mention air raids. During this same period, 8.5 million Germans or about 10 percent of the population of the Greater Reich had actually experienced air raids. If one considers that many of the citizens of the bombed cities were bombed several times and that some inhabitants of the "safe" areas also were concerned about air raids, one is strengthened in the conviction that in a very rough way the figures obtained for the informative mail may be applied to the entire German population.

Table 1. THREE PATTERNS OF THE GERMAN MIND
AS SHOWN BY PERCENTAGES OF THE "INFORMATIVE MAIL"

	Pattern A	Pattern B	Pattern C
Number of Periodical Diary	10	14	21
Period	July and first week in August, 1942	August 10 to mid-September, 1942	November-December, 1942
War	32.5	12.4	22.2
Food	8.9	28.8	15.1
Commodities	10.6	8.6	12.1
Health	6.5	8.1	7.3
Labor	14.6	9.6	10.8
Air Raids	15.5	16.6	8.9
Miscellaneous	11.4	15.9	33.6

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Table 2. WEIGHTED AVERAGES BY CATEGORIES:
JULY 1942 - MARCH 1943
(In percentages of the "informative mail")

Category	Percentage
War.....	22.9
Food.....	16.4
Commodities...	13.1
Health.....	8.6
Labor.....	9.9
Air Raids.....	12.9
Miscellaneous.	16.2

Table 3. REGIONAL BREAKDOWN
(In percentages of the "informative mail")

Number of Regional Report	Period	Number of informative excerpts	Region	War	Air Raids	Food	Commodities	Labor	Health	Miscellaneous
1	Apr.-July,1942	210	Berlin	22.0	0	10.0	....	14.0	14.0	....
4	July-Aug.1942	140	Hamburg	52.7	"very little mention"	17.1	8.6	9.3	5.7	6.5
5	July-Aug.1942	180	Baltic provinces (excl. the ports)	27.3	0	43.8	10.0	6.1	6.1	6.7
7	late July-Aug. 1942	188	Hessen and East. Prisia	23.0	12.2	36.2	9.0	9.0	5.3	5.3
9	late July-Aug. 1942	190	Saxony, Thuringia, Anhalt	33.1	0	43.2	6.8	11.6	5.3	....
11	Aug.1-Sept.15, 1942	283	Greater Berlin	31.8	0	31.8	21.6	8.0	2.5	4.4
12	late Aug.-early Oct.1942	160	Baden	23.2	2.7	36.8	8.4	14.2	6.3	8.4
13	Aug2-Oct.26,1942	240	Westfalia, Hessen, Nassau	25.0	7.5	32.0	....	2.0	....	....
15	late Sept.-Oct. 1942	150	Saar Basin	26.7	8.0	32.0	6.7	18.0	6.0	12.0
16	Oct.-Dec.1942	94	Pr.prov. of Saxony, Anhalt, Brunswick, Lippe-Detmold, Schaumburg-Lippe	37.2	2.9	11.1	14.8	10.0	5.9	11.1
18	Oct.-Nov.1942	170	Mark Brandenburg	26.5	0	32.2	12.8	16.3	5.3	7.1
19	Nov.-Dec.15,1942	200	Hamburg	27.3	9.3	17.7	15.6	6.6	12.6	7.5
20	Oct.-Dec.1942	121	Rhineland	48.3	4.8	8.1	9.1	11.3	3.8	13.9
21	Dec.'42-Jan.'43	88	Silesia	53.4	2.2	10.2	12.5	7.0	9.0	4.5
22	Nov.20,1942-Jan.1,1943	225	North Sea and Baltic ports(from Emden to Reval)	33.5	5.0	12.0	6.6	8.0	7.5	26.4
23	Dec.'42-Feb.'43	104	Bavaria	43.1	3.4	"hardly ment'd"	8.7	13.4	14.1	16.1
24	Nov.-Dec. 1942	150	Austria	42.4	0	14.8	14.8	18.4	4.4	5.2
25	Jan.-Feb. 1943	107	Mecklenburg, Pomerania	29.3	7.8	6.5	9.8	18.2	9.8	15.6
26	Jan.-early Feb. 1943	103	Sudetengau	38.4	0	15.7	18.0	12.8	8.1	1.1
27	Mar.-Apr. 1943	124	Baden and Württemberg	33.2	11.3	6.5	13.8	24.3	3.3	8.1
28	April 1943	172	Berlin	27.3	23.2	3.5	10.5	17.4	12.2	5.8